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A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times 
Robert HOWSE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the most important criticisms of the World Trade Organization that echoed 
loudly in the protests in Seattle in November 1999 is that the WTO unduly constrains the 
regulatory autonomy of Member States, defeating or frustrating democratic choices in 
important areas of social, economic, environmental and cultural policy. When properly 
interpreted and applied, many WTO rules do, however, permit a considerable amount of 
regulatory dwersity, provided the domestic policies in question do not discriminate 
against foreigners. The area where the WTO does interfere most explicitly in the abhty 
of governments to strike a balance in their policies between diverse public values is that 
of intellectual property. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights does prescribe substantive standards of intellectual property protection,' 
limiting the abhty of democratic polities to strike their own balance between the 
provision of incentives for innovation on the one hand and consumer welfare on the 
other; nor are these the only public values at stake, as debates surroundmg biodwersity 
and intellectual property clearly illustrate. Moreover, on a conventional economic 
analysis, unlike the removal of tariffs, quotas and other overtly discriminatory trade 
barriers, raising intellectual property protection may actually reduce total domestic and 
even global economic welfare. For example, in the case of increased patent protection, 
the adhtional monopoly rents to producers may generate little addtional (efficient) 
innovation, whde creating substantial welfare losses to consumers, who are deprived of 
cheaper imitations of patented products.2 As Maskus suggests: 
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494 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
“ ... property rights in information also generate costs. Rent-seelung may be a serious 
problem because the information is being invented anew and bears no defined ownershp 
until its creation is successful. Thus a strong IPR [intellectual property right] system can 
encourage both costly duplication of investment in R&D [research and development] 
through patent races and wasteful efforts to assert ownership rights and to extend them 
beyond the intention of the original grant. Further, enforcement costs may be high because 
it is costly to exclude potential free-riders from exploiting the information. Moreover, 
excluding prospective users imposes static deadweight costs because the marginal cost of 
provision is often small. Finally, the costs of transferring rights to intellectual property may 
be significant because of the contracting difficulties related to uncertainty about the value 
of information, problems in monitoring licensees, and the like.”3 
This being said, thanks particularly to the persistent resistance of developing 
countries to the annihilation of regulatory lversity in TRIPS, the Agreement does 
contain a balance of rights and obligations, providing some significant scope for 
Members to circumscribe intellectual property rights in the name of competing public 
values.4 For instance, Article 7 provides that the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute not only to the promotion of 
technological innovation but also to the transfer and lssemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge, and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
11. THE CANADIAN GENERIC MEDICINES CASE 
The recent decision of a WTO Panel, in the Canadian Generic Medicines case,5 
however, ignores these words about balance and mutual advantage, interpreting the 
patent provisions of the TRIPS Agreement largcly from the perspective of intellectual 
property rights holders, abstracting from competing social interests, and reducing 
considerably the range of regulatory diversity permitted under TRIPS. At first glance, the 
decision may appear a victory for those concerned to limit intellectual property rights 
for compelling reasons of public policy-one of the measures at issue in this dispute, a 
Canadian provision that allowed competing generic manufacturers to test patented 
products before the required period of protection expired, was upheld as consistent with 
the TRIPS Agreement. The companion measure, however, that permitted manufacture 
and storage (“stockpiling”) of patented products before the expiration of the patent so 
that they can be available for sale immediately upon expiration of the patent, was struck 
down. Most importantly, the legal interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement constructed 
by the Panel in this case, if followed in future cases, will have very harmful impacts, 
3 K.E. Maskus, The Znternationai Regulation of Infeiiectrd Property, IESC Conference, Reptiation .f Inrernationai 
4 See, generally, M.J. Trebilcock arid R. Howse, The Regulation oflnternational Tradc, 2nd edition, Routledge, 
Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Generic Medicines), Report of the Panel, WT/DS114/R, 
Trade and Inoesmerrt, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, U.K., 12-14 September 1997. 
London and New York, 1999, Ch. 12. 
17 March 2000. Not appealcd by Canada and now adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body. 
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particularly on developing countries, even if Canada’s generic medicine industry is 
largely satisfied by the result of the ruling. 
Both Canadian measures were aimed at achieving Canada’s long-standing policy 
goal of providing relatively low cost medication to consumers as soon as possible, 
consistent with its basic legal obligation under the WTO Agreement to provide twenty 
years of patent protection.6 Early working exceptions of this kind, which facilitate the 
entry onto the market immediately upon expiration of the twenty-year period of 
mandated patent protection, have been recognized internationally as one means of 
achieving these social goals.’ The TRIPS Agreement provides that patent rights extend 
to the ability to prohibit the non-authorized manufacture and use of a patented product 
(Article 28(l)(a)), and on the other hand reflects the decision of Members to limit the 
required period of protection under a patent to twenty years (Article 33). The 
protection that a patent holder receives from a patent is, fundamentally, the protection 
against competition, i.e. a right to monopoly rents. If it were necessary to prohibit 
manufacture and use of a patented product by a competitor for the full twenty-year 
term, the result would be that the stream of monopoly rents to the patent holder would 
extend beyond the twenty-year period to the length of time after the patent had expired 
that it took the competitor to engage in testing for regulatory approval and manufacture 
for the market. 
A. THE ARTICLE 30 EXCEPTION 
In defending its measures, Canada relied on the Article 30 exception in the TRIPS 
Agreement. This provision states that: 
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent holder, 
takmg account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” 
From this language, the Panel understood Article 30 as containing three separate 




that the exception be limited; 
that it not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent; and 
that it not unreasonably prejumce the legitimate interests of the rights holder, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
6 On the relevant Canadian legal framework, see Government of Canada, Infomation-Review ofthe Patent Act 
Amendment Act, 1992  (Bill C - 9 1 ) ,  February 1997, at <<http://stragegis.ic.gc.ca/pharmf*; and, generally, P. Kavanos, 
Health Policy versus Industrial Policy in the Pharmaceutical Sector: The Case of Canada, 41 Health Policy 241, 1997. 
7 Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, Recommendations on Health Care and Intellectual Pmpeey, Doc. Health 
4-00, Early Working of Patents and Research Exceptions; Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 
Statement ofthe Joint United Natiom Programme on H w / A I D s  at the Third W T O  Ministerial Conference, Seattle, 1999. 
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1. The Meaning .fa “Limited Exception” under Article 30 
In applying this provision to the Canadian measures, the Panel first of all 
considered, in the case of each measure, whether the exception was “limited”. It found 
that the regulatory-testing exception was limited, but not the stockpiling exception. 
However, it considered the meaning of the expression “limited” solely from the 
perspective of the rights holder, and without regard to the policy goals or purposes of 
the exception.8 Even though it was dealing with an explicit “exceptions” provision, 
comprehensible only if there are legitimate, competing policy interests, the Panel was 
only interested in how much the rights holder might lose, not in how much society 
might gain, from a given exception. It never asked what scope the exception might 
require to achieve the social purposes at issue. It thus failed to interpret Article 30 in 
light of the context, purpose, and object of the TRIPS Agreement, as required by 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea t ie~ .~  
Had it followed the requirements ofthe Vienna Convention, the Panel would have 
had to consider the meaning of the word “limited” in reference to Article 7 of TRIPS, 
which evokes the mutual advantage of producers and users, the notion of a balance of 
rights and obligations and, moreover, the notion that protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should be undertaken “in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare”. It also failed to consider the scope indicated by the adjective 
“limited” in light of the protection of public health, an objective explicitly affirmed as 
legitimate in Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. The Panel instead had rapid resort to 
the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement,’” a source of treaty interpretation 
which, according to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, may only be used in the case 
that application of the interpretative sources that are obligatory under Article 31, 
including the purpose, object and context of the treaty, results in ambiguity or 
absurdity.11 
The Panel concluded that the stockpiling exception was not limited, even though 
there was a time-limit on the exception which allowed it to be used only in the final six 
months before expiration of the patent and only by those availing themselves of the 
testing exception. With respect to the six-month cap, the Panel had to admit that this 
was some kind of limitation, as that was obvious.12 However, the Panel adopted the 
complainant’s view that a narrower rather than broader meaning of “limited” should be 
applied; i.e. “limited” should be read to mean “small”. The tenor of this reasoning is 
exactly contrary to the interpretive principles established by the Appellate Body in 
* “. . . ‘limited’ is to be measured by the extent to which the exclusive rights of the patent holder have been 
L, Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, 23 May 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331,8 International Legal Materials 
I” Generic Medicines, supra, footnote 5, para. 7.29. 
curtailed.’’: Generic Medicines, supra, footnote 5, para. 7.31. 
679. 
Resort to the negotiating history may also be used to confirm an interpretation properly made, based on the 
sources of interpretation in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. But this, of course, prr-supposes proper 
application of Article 31 before resort to the negotiating history. 
Generic Medicines, supra, footnote 5, para. 7.37. 
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 hormone^.'^ There, according to the Appellate Body, the principle of in dubio mitius 
requires that, where there are two plausible approaches to the interpretation of a treaty 
provision, the treaty interpreter adopt the interpretation that is less restrictive of the 
sovereignty of the State or States undertaking the obligation in question.14 
In justifylng its decision to choose the narrower interpretation, the Panel relied on 
the character of Article 30 as an “exception”: since the notion of an “exception” itself 
suggests a limited right, when the word “limited” is added, the exception must truly be 
intended to be narrow. The Panel appears to have let assumptions about “exceptions” 
themselves, being by their nature grudging or confined, influence its reading of the 
modifying adjective “limited”. Thus, it remarks: 
“The word ‘exception’ by itself connotes a limited derogation, one that does not undercut 
the body of rules from which it is made. When a treaty uses the term ‘limited exception’ 
the word must be given a meaning separate from the limitation implicit in the word 
exception itself. The term ‘limited exception’ must therefore be read to connote a narrow 
exception-a-ie which makes only a small diminution of the rights in question.”15 
This is precisely the kind of interpretation of exceptions that the Appellate Body 
rejected in the Hormones case. There the Appellate Body held: 
“ ... merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by itself justifir a 
‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of the provisions than would be warranted by 
examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in 
light of the treaty’s object and purpose . . .”I6 
As is suggested in this passage, the presumption that exceptions must be read 
narrowly may be connected to a failure to consider the words of the treaty, in light of 
its object and purpose. This is precisely the case with the Panel here, which assumed 
that the basic purpose of the TRIPS Agreement “was to lay down minimum 
requirements for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights”. 
However, as indcated by Article 7 of TRIPS, the basic purpose is not protection and 
enforcement of these private rights as such, but rather in a manner so as to achieve the 
mutual advantage of both producers and users and a balance of obligations and rights 
and to contribute to social and economic welfare. To do justice to this purpose, the 
Panel would, at a minimum, have had to consider the scope implied in the word 
“limited” from the perspective not only of how much rights holders’ interests were 
being curtailed but also &om the perspective of how limited the exception could be 
13 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hornones), Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AFVR, 16 January 1998. 
14 Ibid., para. 165 and accompanying footnote. 
15 Generic Medicines, supra, footnote 5, para. 7.309. 
16 Hornones, supra, footnote 13. 
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while affording sufficient scope to protect public health and the interests of consumers 
generally. 17 
All this being said, it is something of a mystery as to how the Panel could find the 
testing exception sufficiently narrow but not the stockpiling exception. In fact, the 
testing exception could actually much more substantially curtail rents that the patent 
holder might receive after the end of the twenty-year period than might the stockpiling 
exception, since the period of testing required as a preliminary for regulatory approval 
of pharmaceuticals in Canada was three years, much longer than the six-month period 
for stockpiling. But for the testing exception, the patent holder might have three 
additional years beyond the twenty-year period of protection to collect monopoly rents, 
as the competing generic manufacturer would have to wait until the end of the twenty 
years to begin testing for regulatory approval, thus having to delay an additional three 
years or so after that before the generic product would have regulatory approval and 
therefore be competing on the actual market-place. By failing to consider properly the 
meaning of the word “limited” in light of the object and purpose of the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Panel was left without an analytical framework which would allow a 
principled distinction between exemptions that are limited within the meaning of 
Article 30 and those that are not. The Panel as much as admitted that intuitive line- 
drawing was what it was doing.18 
2. Normal Exploitation of the Patent 
The second condition for taking an exception under Article 30 is that the 
exception not “unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent”. Here 
the Canadian argument was, sensibly enough, that since neither the regulatory testing 
nor the stockpiling exception interfered with the stream of monopoly rents to the patent 
holder during the twenty-year-minimum period of protection required by Article 33 of 
TRIPS, neither unreasonably conflicted with “normal exploitation”. Since the Panel had 
already found that the stockpiling exception was not limited, it did not need to go on 
to consider whether that exception did not “unreasonably conflict with normal 
exploitation of the patent”, but rather only whether or not the regulatory testing 
exception did so. Nevertheless, the Panel, in dicta as it were, drew a sharp distinction 
‘7 The Panel does give an explanation of why it considers only the interests of the rights holder. It suggests 
that Article 30 as a whole should not be interpreted as affecting the balance of rights and obligations established by 
the other provisions of the TluPs Agreement, because the “three limiting conditions attached to Article 30 testify 
strongly that the negotiators of the Agreement did not intend Article 30 to bring about what would be equivalcnt 
to a renegotiation of the basic balance of the Agreement.” (para. 7.26). This is transparently circular reasoning. The 
Panel interprets the three conditions narrowly because it assumes that Article 30 as a whole docs not affect the 
balance otherwise established in the TRIPS Agreement, but this general reading of Article 30 depends entirely upon 
a narrow interpretation of the three conditions! The Panel assumes what it is trying to prove. Thus, the existence 
of the three conditions in Article 30 would hardly show that it does not affect, or is not part of, the overall balance 
of the TKIPS Agreement, unless one arrunres a narrow view of the conditions. ’* “Without seeking to define exactly what level of curtailment would be disqualifjing, it was clear to the 
Panel that an exception which results in a substantial curtailment of the dinlension [of exclusionary Eights granted 
to patent holders] cannot be considered a ‘limited’ cxccption within the meaning of Article 30.” In other words, 
we won’t tell you what thc lcgal standard is, but we know that this exception does not meet it. 
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between the exceptions as far as normal exploitation went, perhaps aware that the 
distinction it drew with respect to the first criterion of being limited was conclusory, if 
not obscure. 
In interpreting “normal”, the Panel looked exclusively at the expectations of rights 
holders as to the “economic returns anticipated from a patent’s grant of market 
exclusivity”. This again reflects its overall bias in viewing the TRIPS Agreement as 
having, as its overarching goal, the protection of the rights of innovators, not a balance 
of rights and obligations between different relevant social and economic interests. Patent 
holders in general could anticipate that they would enjoy monopoly rents from the 
patent even beyond the twenty-year period of protection, due to the ability to prevent 
manufacturing of the product fiom beginning before the end of that period and the 
consequent delay in getting the product to market until sufficient product is 
manufactured. Thus, the monopoly rents obtained after the twenty-year period until 
the competitor is able to come to market with its stock constituted part of normal 
exploitation. 
If one were to examine the meaning of “normal”, however, from the perspective 
of those interests that dictated a limit on the period of protection required by TRIPS to 
twenty years, a quite different answer might result; these interests might well anticipate 
that in establishing a maximum of twenty years of required exclusion of competition, 
the TRIPS Agreement allows Members to ensure that the significant social and economic 
benefits of a competitive market-place begin to flow immediately following the expiry 
of the required twenty-year period of monopoly. Recognition of the significance of the 
levels of protection in the TRIPS Agreement as a maximum required under WTO law is 
to be found in Article 1.1 of TRIPS, which explicitly states that Members shall not be 
“obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement.” This provision would be largely19 inutile or tautological unless there were 
some possibility that, in certain circumstances, the operation of dispositions of the TRIPS 
Agreement, taken together, could have the effect of conferring, overall, more extensive 
protection than that provided as a matter of law by each individual provision. As a study 
for the World Health Organization notes: 
“These general provisions were included in the Agreement to make for a balance between 
the rights of patent holders and their obligations vis-d-vis society. Member States may 
therefore base certain particular provisions of their national regulations on these 
provisions. ’’XI 
The case at hand is a perfect illustration of this. Article 33 of TRIPS provides a legal 
19 It might still arguably be used to reinforce an action under GATT law, complaining of unilateral trade 
measures against a Member in response to its failure to adopt higher levels of protection than those required by the 
TRIPS Agreement. See Trebilcock and Howse, supra, footnote 4, p. 323. However, the main point is that the treaty 
interpreter should not lightly assume an interpretation of a treaty provision that renders it inutile within the treaty 
instrument that contains the provision, in t h s  case the TRIPS Agreement, which is an independent legal instrument. 
20 World Health Organization, Action Programme on Essential Drugs, Globalization and Access to Dnrgs: 
Perspectives on the WTO/TRIPS Agreement, Health Economics and Drugs, DAP Series No. 7, Revised, 1999, p. 10. 
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guarantee of monopoly rents (i.e. exclusion of competition) for a twenty-year period. 
However, the operation of Article 28, by including the right to prohibit making or 
using in the patent right, acts in combination with Article 33, to provide effective 
monopoly rents beyond the twenty-year period guaranteed as a matter of law by 
Article 33. In such a circumstance, what TRIPS, Article 1.1 tells us is that a Member may 
act to avoid the operation of the TRIPS Agreement from leading to effective protection 
in excess of that explicitly and legally guaranteed in the Agreement, which is, in this 
case, twenty years of monopoly rents. And this gives a coherent meaning to “normal 
exploitation”, namely exploitation within the limited period of market exclusivity 
explicitly guaranteed to the patent holder by law in Article 33. 
In explaining why the Canadian regulatory testing exception fit within the Panel’s 
notion of “normal”, while the stockpiling exception would not, the Panel made the 
following observation: 
“Some ofthe basic rights granted to all patent owners, and routinely exercised by all patent 
holders, will typically produce a certain period of market exclusivity after the expiration of 
a patent. For example, the separate right to prevent ‘malung’ the patented product during 
the term of the patent often prevents competitors from building an inventory needed 
to enter the market immediately upon expiration of a patent. There is nothing abnormal 
about the more or less brief period of market exclusivity after the patent has expired. The 
Panel considered that Canada was on firmer ground, however, in arguing that the additional 
period of defucto market exclusivity created by using patent rights to preclude submissions 
for regulatory authorization should not be considered ‘normal’. The additional period of 
market exclusivity in this situation is not a natural or normal consequence of enforcing 
patent rights. It is an unintended consequence of the conjunction of the patent laws with 
product regulatory laws, where the combination of patent rights with the time demands of 
the regulatory process gives a greater-than-normal period of market exclusivity to the 
enforcement of certain patent rights.”21 
This distinction may be artificial. The time required to build an inventory for sale 
subsequent to the expiry of the patent may well reflect the need to use production 
methods that respond to requirements for safety and quality in production, the same 
regulatory concerns that, ultimately, underlie a lengthy period of testing prior to 
regulatory approval. Moreover, the ability of producers to build inventory rapidly, while 
ensuring quality and safety, may well differ depending upon levels of economic 
development. In the Canadan case, the time needed was apparently around three 
weeks-but one could not assume the same for generic producers in developing 
countries, where (ironically), given the weak purchasing power of the vast majority of 
consumers, any delay in the marketing of generic products at a lower cost might have 
significant health consequences, if not in certain cases deadly ones. It is significant in this 
respect that, while most of the developed countries who intervened as third parties in 
the litigation, most notably the United States and Japan, viewed the stockpiling 
provision as different from the testing provision, and not justifiable under Article 30, the 
developing country intervenors, including Brazil, Ecuador, Cuba and Thailand, 
z1 Generic Medicines, supra, footnote 5, paras. 7.56 and 7.57. 
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generally saw the two provisions as linked, and viewed both as acceptable under 
Article 30. 
Finally, by limiting those early worlung exceptions that are consistent with normal 
exploitation to those connected with government requirements for regulatory approval, 
the Panel in effect excluded the possibility of early worlung exceptions for purposes of 
scientific research. There may be important social gains from allowing such research 
activity during the period in which the rights holder is enjoying monopoly rents from 
the patent.22 It is to be noted, however, that, in discussing the meaning of “legtimate 
interests”, the third criterion for an Article 30 exception (lscussed in the next section 
of this article) the Panel cited scientific research as among those legitimate interests that 
might need to be balanced against those of the patent holder. Perhaps the Panel felt that 
in an appropriate case, even though a scientific research exception did interfere with 
normal exploitation of the patent, it might nevertheless not do so unreasonably. Thus, 
although it will make justification of scientific research exceptions more difficult under 
TRIPS, the Panel’s approach to the meaning of “normal exploitation” may not exclude 
altogether the possibility of such exceptions being legal under TRIPS, given that 
Article 30 does permit interference with normal exploitation that is not “unreasonable”. 
3.  Legitimate Interests 
The third condition for talung an exception under Article 30 is that the exception 
“not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into 
account the legitimate interests of third parties”. In considering whether this criterion 
was met with respect to the regulatory-testing exception, wlnch had now passed the first 
two criteria, the Panel once again displayed its myopic focus on the interests of the rights 
holder. Here, this bias is even more dramatic, since the very language of the provision 
indicates the need to balance diverse social and economic interests. Thus, for the Panel, 
the fact that the “legitimate interests of the rights holder” is mentioned first, indicates a 
logical sequence, a lexical priority as it were. One cannot even begin to consider what 
third-party interests might be without first of all ascertaining “the legitimacy and weight 
of the patent owner’s legitimate interests.”23 This provides a route for avoidance of any 
kind of real balancing-one can silence competing social and economic interests 
entirely by starting off with defining the rights holder’s interests as so weighty or 
fundamental that other legitimate interests cannot possibly outweigh the prejulce to 
rights holder’s interests. 
In interpreting the word “legitimate” in Article 30, the Panel once again &d not 
fulfill the obligations of a treaty interpreter under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention. Without considering whether it could render a correct interpretation of 
the expression “legitimate” on the basis of the sources of treaty interpretation that are 
22 R. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress o j  Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 University of 
23 Genetic Medicines, supra, footnote 5 ,  para. 7.60. 
Chicago Law Renew 1017, 1989. 
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obligatory under Article 31 of thc Vienna Convention, it had recourse to the 
negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement, a supplemental means of interpretation 
that, according to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, may only be resorted to in the 
case of ambiguity or absurdq resulting from the application of Article 31 sources of 
interpretation, or to confirm an Article 3 1-based interpretation. O f  course, obligatory 
sources of interpretation under Article 31 include the “context”: the full text of the 
treaty itself, including the Preamble.24 
The first step of the Panel in determining what interests are legitimate within the 
meaning of Article 30 of TRIPS should thus have been to consider whether there are 
interests recognized as legitimate in the TRIPS Agreement itself. These interests include, 
irrter a h ,  “the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge” 
(Article 7, emphasis added); “public health and nutrition” (Article 8); and “the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to socio-economic and technological 
development” (Article 8). With respect to patents in particular, Article 27.2 of TRIPS 
lists such competing interests as “ordre public or morality”; “human, animal or plant life 
or health”; and avoidance of “serious prejudice to the environment”. All these interests 
are given legal weight in the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, had it followed the practice 
of treaty interpretation required by the Vienna Convention, the Panel, in considering 
the language “mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge”, 
would have understood that the legitimate interests of the patent holder are not to be 
considered prior to other interests, but inherently in relation to those other interests, 
particularly those of users of technological knowledge. 
However, the damage done by the Panel with respect to its application of the 
“legitimate interests” criterion is rather limited. It came to the conclusion, based on 
various negotiating documents, including those related to legal instruments other than 
the TRIPS Agreement, including the Berne Convention (on copyright!) that legitimate 
interests of the patent holder did not, as the EC asserted, mean the legal rights of the 
patent holder as defined in Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, but that it had some kind 
of broader meaning, however ill-defined. The Panel knew what the patent holder’s 
legitimate interests were not, even if it lackcd clarity on what they were-and since they 
were not what the EC said they were, it was able to avoid actually examining the 
balance between these and other legitimate interests by simply viewing the EC as not 
having proven the first step of its legal argument. 
The EC, however, made a second claim about “legitimate interests”. This was the 
claim that, in fact, patent holders themselves enjoy less than twenty years effective 
protection, because of the regulatory-approval requirements they are subject to. 
According to the EC, being able to obtain monopoly rents beyond the twenty-year 
patent period, while marketing of the generic product is delayed due to regulatory 
approval, merely compensates for the original delay to which the patented product itself 
is subject for regulatory-approval purposes. 
24 Vienna Convention, r q m ,  footnote 9, Article 31.2 
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Here, in order to determine whether the interest of the patent holder in 
compensation for its own loss of monopoly rents during the twenty-year period due to 
regulatory-approval delays was “legitimate”, the Panel examined how this problem was 
treated in a number of jurisdictions in developed countries. It noted that some 
jurisdictions had increased the term of protection beyond twenty years, but others had 
not, in response to this concern about the effects on the patent-holder’s exclusive rights 
due to regulatory-approval delays.25 
The Panel noted correctly that, where governments had not extended the patent 
term for these reasons, “these government decisions may represent either disagreement 
with the normative claim made by the EC in this proceedmg, or they may simply 
represent a conclusion that such claims are outweighed by other interests.”26 Without 
any supporting reasoning, the Panel simply agreed with Canada that the interest of the 
patent holder was not “legtimate” at all. It merely asserted that to be legtimate an 
interest has to be “compelling” and widely recognized (presumably in domestic 
legislation) .27 This conclusion displays the damage that the Panel’s interpretive approach 
has done to the fundamental structure of Article 3 G i f  the patent holder’s legitimate 
interests means a compelling interest, how can it then ever not trump the other 
legitimate interests to be taken account of under Article 30? The notion of wide 
recognition should raise some red flags as well-if wide recognition by governments is 
substituted for recognition within the TRIPS Agreement itself (the correct approach to 
interpreting “legitimate” on the basis of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention) as the 
criterion for legitimacy, what about interests recognized only, for instance, by 
developing countries as legtimate, not developing ones? 
The TRIPS Agreement allows the economic interests of rights holders to be taken 
into account as legitimate, and indeed in the earlier stages of its analysis, ironically, the 
Panel itself viewed these as not only more legitimate, but actually primary and 
paramount. This is arguably even implicit in the description of intellectual property 
rights as “private rights” in the Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement. However, the extent 
to which-such interests are recognized as legitimate is circumscribed by Article 7, which 
refers to “mutual advantage” of rights holders and users of technology. Thus, the 
economic interests of the rights holders cannot be given a status as “legitimate interests” 
that defeats the “advantage” of users of technology. 
An appropriate interpretation of Article 30 in this case would have accepted the 
interests of the rights holders as “legitimate to an extent”, but would have examined 
whether the Canalan exceptions caused unreasonable prejudice to these interests, 
talung account of the legitimate interests of third parties. Here, Canada argued that these 
third-partyinterests were above all the health interests of its citizens. Would the Panel 
here have to conduct some kind of open-ended, undisciplined balancing of legitimate 
25 Generic Medicines. sum. footnote 5. oara. 7.78. 
I ‘ ,  I I  
26 Ibid., para. 7.80. 
27 Ibid., para. 7.82. 
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rights holders’ economic interests against the interests of health?28 Arguably not. The 
Vienna Convention includes among the obligatory sources of treaty interpretation in 
Article 31.3.c, “any relevant rules of international law applicable in relations between 
the parties”. In interpreting the nature of “health” as a legitimate interest within the 
meaning of Article 30 of TRIPS, it would be appropriate to consider, first of all, that 
public health is one of those interests explicitly indicated in Article 8.1 to be capable of 
being advanced “consistent with the provisions of this Agreement”. Thus, Article 8.1 
precludes a reading of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that would make those 
provisions inconsistent with the right to adopt measures necessary to protect public 
health.29 Then, pursuant to Article 31.3.c of the Vienna Convention, to determine the 
meaning of “necessary to protect public health”, one would have recourse to relevant 
international health law. In interpreting the scope of “exhaustible natural resources” as 
a legitimate interest protected by Article xx(g) of the GATT, the Appellate Body took a 
broad view of the sources of international law that could be appropriately used to 
articulate the relevant evolving international legal order, including “soft law” sources, 
such as resolutions and authoritative reports and policy statements of relevant 
international organizations.30 
World health policy explicitly endorses measures aimed at rapid market availabhty 
of generic medicines. Thus, in a recent speech, Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director- 
General of the World Health Organization, declared: 
“WHO supports implementation of the TRIPS Agreement to ensure prompt availability of 
generic drugs upon patent expiration. WHO has long promoted use of generic drugs of 
assured quality. Experience from countries with ‘generic-friendly’ policies clearly 
demonstrates that the market competition created by these policies increases the 
afFordability of medicines, stimulates true innovation with the research-based industry, and 
encourages increased production efficiency by the generic industry.”31 
28 This kind of exercise would entail the Panel engaging in a judgment on complex and sometimes conflicting 
expert opinions concerning the effect of competition from generics on drug prices. For a clear statement of the 
complexities of such an analysis, and the variables at issue, see K. Maskus, Price Efects and Competition Aspects of 
Intellectual Propetty R%hts in Developing Countries, Background Paper for 1998 World Development Report, The World 
Bank, Washngton, D.C., 12 January 1998, pp. 4-8. See the divergent views in P. Challu, ?he Consequences 
Product Patenting, 15 W. Cornp. 2, December 1991, p. 65, and in R. Rozek and R. Berkowitz, Tke EJeits oJPAatent 
Protection on thcv Prices o j  Pharmaceutical Products-Is Intellectual Property Protection Raising the Drq Bill in Developing 
Countries! 1 J.W.I.P. 2, March 1998, p. 179. 
29 There is an alternative reading ofArticle 8.1, which is that it merely states that Members may take whatever 
measures necessary to protect public health are consistent with the provisions of the Tlurs Agreement. However, 
read in this way, Article 8.1 would be meaningless. It would simply say that what is not prohibited under the 
Agreement is permitted. Since it is a fundamental principle of international law that the sovereignty of States is 
plenary, except to the extent circumscribed by international law itself, Article 8.1 read this way would be totally 
redundant and superfluous. See, generally, “ h e  Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of 
International Justice (1927), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10. It is also possible that Article 8.1 might be used to reinforce a 
WTO action under the GATT complaining of unilateral trade measures targeted towards pressuring a Member to 
refrain from policies that are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement: see Trebilcock and Howse, siipra, footnote 4, 
p. 323. However, Article 8.1 should be presumed to have some legal significance within the four corners of the 
TKIIJ~ Agreement itself, which is a separate legal instrument. 
30 United States-Intport Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 
October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 128 and 130. 
31 World Health Organization, Office of the Director-General, rnternAt~onul Trade Agreements And P&lic Health: 
WHO’S Role, Conference on Inneasing Access to Esrential Drugs in a Globalized Economy, Amsterdam, 25-26 
November 1999. 
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As already noted, early worlung exceptions have been supported by the Secretariat 
of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.~~ 
Thus, world health policy, as evidenced in recent authoritative statements from the 
leadershp of international institutions responsible for health, suggests that the protection 
of public health entails, among other measures, early worlung exceptions for patents. To 
read Article 30 consistently with world health policy would mean gving clear priority 
to the legitimate health interests in question over any competing interests of the rights 
holder; if the reference to public health in Article 8.1 of TRIPS is to have any significance 
at all, it must surely be that the specific provisions of the TRIPS Agreement should be 
read in a manner consistent with what is required for the protection of public health, as 
defined by world health policy. 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 30 AND THE ARTICLE 27 
NON-DISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT 
Perhaps most damaging of all to the legitimate balance of rights and obligations in 
the TRIPS Agreement is the Panel’s finding, despite the lack of a textual basis for any 
such limit, that exceptions under Article 30 cannot include exceptions to the non- 
discrimination provisions in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. These non- 
&scrimination provisions are very different from those typically found in other WTO 
treaties, which prohibit discrimination between domestic and foreign products and 
services. Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement prohibits cbscrimination, inter alia, with 
respect to “field of technology”. However, based on legitimate social and economic 
objectives, a Member may well wish to limit intellectual property rights in one 
particular industrial sector-generic medicines is of course a classic example. The 
importance of health concerns in this sector might well argue in favour of limits that it 
would be inappropriate to impose across the board on all sectors. Across-the-board 
imposition might create totally unnecessary costs for both domestic and foreign 
industries in those sectors-unnecessary in terms of the policy purposes of the measures 
in question. Thus, according to the Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue: 
“Article 27.1 should not be interpreted as requiring a ‘one size fits all’ patent law. The 
language in 27.1 ... should not be interpreted as preventing countries from addressing 
public interest concerns in patents, when provisions to address those public interest 
concerns are consistent with the TRIPS framework. Article 30 of the TRIPS regarding 
exceptions to patent rights should be interpreted to permit countries to address public 
interest concerns, including those specifically related to fields of technology.”33 
The Panel was able to m i s s  entirely the implications for research and development 
of its treatment of manufacturing under Article 30 because of its general indifference to 
the purposes that underlie the talung of exceptions under that Article. 
The Panel’s reasoning on this issue is totally perverse-it claims that Article 27.1 
32 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, supra, footnote 7. 
33 Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, supra, footnote 7. 
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limits the Article 30 exception because there is nothing in Article 30 that says otherwise. 
But, where there is no explicit qualification to an exception, one should assume that the 
exception applies generally to its explicit subject-matter, which is, in this case, patent 
rights. Throughout the TRIPS Agreement, where the parties wished to qualifj a right or 
obligation in a particular provision by making it conditional on some other provision of 
the Agreement, they employed the formula that the right or obligation is “subject to” 
that other provision.34 The Panel suggests that: 
“It is quite plausible, as the EC argued, that the TRIPS Agreement would want to require 
governments to apply exceptions in a non-discriminatory manner, in order to ensure that 
governments do not succumb to domestic pressure to limit exceptions to areas where right 
holders tend to be foreign prod~cers .”~~ 
However, if the requirement with respect to non-discrimination on the basis of 
sector of technology were aimed at preventing this kind of discrimination against 
foreign producers, it would be superfluous, for Article 27.1 quite independently 
prohibits discrimination based on “whether products are imported or locally produced”. 
The interpretive error of the Panel here is related to its earlier interpretive error 
conccrning the meaning of “taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties”. 
When interpreted properly, this requirement of Article 30 would be hardly likely to be 
met in the case of an exception that was limited in such a way as to result in a lack of 
even-handedness as between the treatment of domestic and foreign producers. 
To some extent, the Panel repaired the damage done by its forced reading of thc 
relationship of Article 27.1 to Article 30 by finding that the Canadian measure I d  not 
violate Article 27.1 because, although it was applied only to the pharniaceutical sector, 
the statutory provision itself was framed in general terms.36 This approach leaves it up 
to the Panel to determine on a case-by-case basis when a general non-sector-specific 
exception applied in practice to only one sector constitutes a sham in respect of the non- 
discrimination obligation in Article 27.1. This reduces the legal security of both rights 
holders and those social interests seeking to limit intellectual property protection, and 
increases the scope for panels to make intuitive, sniff-test-type judgments about when 
inappropriate discrimination is occurring. 
111. CONCLUSION 
By failing to interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a manner that does justice to the 
delicate balance of social and economic interests reflected in the stated purposes of that 
Agreement, the Panel has crafted a set of readings that unduly curbs the regulatory 
autonomy of Members and that will undermine the legitimacy of the WTO in the eyes 
of its critics at a difficult point in the Organization’s history. Despite the far-reaching 
implications of this decision, particularly for the systemic concerns of developing 
?‘ This formula is eniployed in Articles 6, 27.1, 36 and 65.1 
is Generic Medirines, supra, footnote 5, para. 7.92. 
ih Ibid., paras. 7.98 and 7.99. 
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countries about TRIPS, critics should not, however, allow this ruling to obscure other 
developments in WTO jurisprudence favourable to a balanced and sensitive reading of 
TRIPS. For instance, the recent Panel on Section 301 of the U.S. trade leg1slation37 took 
a sensitive view of the extent to which WTO panels should micro-manage the choices 
of Members in reflecting WTO obligations in their domestic law, suggesting that one 
could not consider whether a statute adequately implemented WTO obligations without 
looking at other elements in a Member’s domestic legal and administrative landscape, 
such as constitutional rules and declarations of the authorities as to how the statute might 
be read or applied. While the Panel I d  not contradict any proposition oflaw established 
by the Appellate Body in the Indian Patents case,38 it did produce an analytical optic 
much less intrusive of domestic sovereignty than that through which the Panel in Indian 
Patents viewed the evidence of compliance with WTO law in that case. Thus, not all the 
recent news from Geneva is bad. 
37 United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, 22 December 1999, 
WT/DS152/R (adouted). 
38 India-P;lteniProiechon f . r  Phamaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Productx, Report of  the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS50,16 January 1998. 
